T HIS note, pertinent to some recent literature on public goods,l presents two propositions which place the question of the optimal expenditure levels for public goods in a somewhat different perspective. By (pure) public goods or, synonymously, (pure) collective consumption goods, we mean those consumer goods having the property that, once produced, their enjoyment by each and every individual does not reduce their availability for the enjoyment of others. Public defense and public health measures may suggest cases in point.
I t was natural and proper for Professor Samuelson in his recent elucidation of the problem of determining the optimal amounts of social goods for society to produce to formulate and treat this problem in the context of allocation theory. Given a social welfare function, i.e., some criterion for choosing among all the Pareto-optimal welfare positions, what outputs of various social goods are indicated? Our purpose here is to cast this problem of welfare economics in a somewhat different way and to show that, within limits, decisions about the production of social goods should be regarded as decisions about th;distribution of income which are independent of questions of economic ineffic i e n~y .We adopt the viewpoint of the New (If some individuals were not desirous of certain public goods, some of these partial derivatives would be zero. This would complicate the mathematical treatment somewhat without affecting the essence of our argument.) There is, moreover, a social transformation function
describing the production possibilities open to the economy.
We assume, in addition, that the private goods sector of the economy is organized so as to satisfy the usual optimal exchange conditions, each individual maximizing his utility subject to fixed common prices (and wage rates) and to any fixed income arising at least in part from whatever social dividend he may r e~e i v e .~ Therefore, u;= pnu;,
I
. justified by the feasibility consideration that, even if these are not IOO per cent efficient in avoiding avoidable deadweight loss, they may be better than the attainable imperfect tax alternatives." ("Diagrammatic Exposition . . . ,"
356.)
M y purpose is to look into this point somewhat systematically.
M y analysis does differ from Samuelson's in this regard. I impose as constraints on the maximization process the optimality conditions for allocation in the private goods sector
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where ul is a uY/ a:; pn is the price of commodity n(p, = I , the Nth commodity serving as numkraire); and s q s that component of individual i's income deriving from the ownership of fixed-income assets (whose productive services do not appear among the x17s and whose supply is perfectly price-inelastic) and his social dividend (transfer receipts).
The remaining requirement is that ssi = H, H a constant.
This conserves "purchasing power" in the economY by requiring the algebraic Sum of transfer payments to be zero.4 T o find the Pareto optima we extremize Zwiui, where the w' are "weights," wi > o, i = I ,
I
. . . , I for all possible values of the wi's, provided only that these weights are normalized, e.g., by wI = I . 5 We therefore form the auxiliary Lagrangean equation
where ' 7 the the and P are undetermined multipliers. This is to be extremized with to the $7s> the Sk's7 the P n 7~> and the si7s for a given vector (wl = I ) . We thereby obtain the conditions
where T , is the partial of T with respect to Z X~, and uLn is a cross-partial derivative, and maximize (stepwise) with respect to the quantities of public goods. Samuelson derives the optimality conditions for the allocation of both private and public goods simultaneously.
If we wanted the return on capital services (or, more precisely, on factor services whose supply does not appear in the utility functions) and rental incomes to depend on the market equilibrium attained, we could complicate the model by explicitly introducing these services and their prices. But this would only clutter up the page, without affecting anything we have to say.
'This is to find the points on the utility possibility frontier that have tangents that are negatively sloped with respect to all side planes of the utility space. If it has been possible to transform (i.e., select) the individual utility functions so that the possibility frontier is nicely behaved, as we shall assume, this method will pick out all the Pareto optima. Otherwise, some technical qualifications are needed.
. . . Sk ...) +2 2 pn[uin-~nui,l +xki[2Pn~i-~il will a different and arbitrary decision, say, ST,
and -k i + p = o ,
(10) Equations ( The usual loose criterion for determinacy (finding equations and unknowns equal in number) is therefore satisfied.
I1
Given then a set of weights, the which serve in place of a social welfare function, there will be a determinate solution for the output of public goods, say, Sy, . . ., SO,. Any other decision about the amounts of these goods may be expected not to lead to the same optimum. But . . ., S; lead simply to another Pareto optimum or to a Pareto-inferior position?
If the answer is the latter, then in deciding upon the amounts of social goods to produce, the problem of ineficiency in production is encountered. If the answer is the former, then a decision as to the S,'s is a choice among Pareto optima and we shall-say the problem is a strictly distributional one.
Suppose we assume next that the number of public goods to be considered is less than the number of individuals, i.e., that K < I. Then treat the (I-l)wi's as variables (remembering that wl= I ) . Equations (I)- (5) and (7)-(10) may then be solved for those wi7s. Moreover, since K may be less than I-I , the solution need not be unique. If one possible solution has the property that wi > 0, i = I , . . . , I -I , the arbitrary choice of S,, . . . , S, will have led to a Pareto optimum. The optimum will require, however, the appropriate selection of si's. This is to say that provided K < I and w' > o, i = I , . . . , I -I, an arbitrary decision as to the amounts of public goods to be produced will be optimal provided that transfer payments are appropriately chosen. These transfer payments tions in the S,'s for which welfare will be opcan, of course, be regarded as the individual timal. That a set of S,<'s be chosen from this assessments levied to "pay" for the production region is a question of allocative efficiency, but of the social goods. Indeed, if the solution for the particular choice from within this region is the mi's is not unique subject to the condition a distributional question alone. Indeed, put that they all be positive, then the solution for somewhat loosely, it would appear that if the si's will not be unique either. We may count K +J + I is small relative to I -I , the danger up to I-I -K "degrees of freedom" for the si's, of an inefficient allocation of resources resulting in the sense that we may be able to choose values from any reasonable decision about the producfor that many si's quite arbitrarily (within what tion of public goods would also be small. may be quite broad limits).
As a practical matter transfer payments can-I11 not be placed on an individual basis. This would require the feasibility of as many different flat Now> there is nothing peculiar to the 'aturt?
taxes and subsidies as there are individuals in of public goods that is responsible for these rethe economy. So many "degrees of freedom" sults. If there is some latitude in picking the are simply not available to the State. If account K Sk7s, there is also some latitude in picking is taken of this, we may wish to modify the mod-any K other variables that we can get our hands el by requiring that on. For example, we might consider setting any K prices arbitrarily. Replace S,, . . .,S, whersl = s* = ... = S ever they appear in section I1 with the prices of If + + I <I -I , as would seem realistic ciently to achieve a desired income distribution in a political context, the I + I transfer payOn a feasibdity frontier.6 merits and receipts and the K amounts of public But there is peculiar to the nature goods can be chosen arbitrarily and the system of public goods that makes these results espesolved for ( + + I )w;ls (the remainder be-cially interesting. I t is that, whereas the output ing arbitrarily). If all was are found to decisions regarding private goods may be left to be positive, a pareto optimum results. This is a free market with prices and amounts sold to to say that K + J + I -I and wi various individuals determined by competitive > o, i = I, . . .. I -I, an arbitrary decision as market forces, this is not possible for public to the amounts of public goods to be produced goods. is any other very solution will be optimal regardless of what transfer pay-available. This is precisely the point of Samments are chosen.
uelson's original article: "the failure of market If we assume that the uils can be regarded as catallactics." What we claim to have shown is continuous functions of the S,'s and the s"s, that with K + J + I <I-I , this difficult probthen about any optimal position there will be a lem can be largely avoided, precisely by seizing range of variation possible in the S,'s and s"s ' POn public goods as devices so that the resulting welfare position remains controlling the distribution of income.
More we can say that for See Samuelson, "Evaluation of Real National Income," given si's there will be a range of possible varia-Oxford Economic Papers, n.s. 11 (January 1g50).
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